We present an architecture for network authenticated disks that can be used to implement distributed file systems without file servers and without encryption. Network file systems suffer from poor performance due to file access time and protocol overhead at the file server. In order to mitigate these costs, it has been proposed that disks should be directly attached to the network, providing network clients with direct network access to remote storage. Since the file server authenticates the network clients in classical file systems, the network attached storage must also be able to authenticate the network clients that are directly accessing them. The authentication used by our network attached storage avoids doing key exchange and encryption.
Introduction
The need to access anything from anywhere has increased the role of distributed file servers in computing. Distributed file systems provide local file system semantics for access to remote storage. This allows network clients to incorporate the remote storage into the local file system. File semantics are well understood by users and applications, making distributed file servers a convenient tool to use in developing distributed applications.
As the role played by distributed file systems expands, some shortcomings of their design become increasingly evident. Faster clients, high bandwidth connections, and larger drive capacities increase the demand on file servers. Although it would seem that network file server performance would be limited by the I/O capacity of the system storage devices, in actuality, file servers frequently are CPU bound. Riedel and Gibson discovered that, even with low overall CPU utilization, burst loads were sufficiently intense to over-utilize the server [10] .
Applications that rely on distributed file systems should not be compromised by security weaknesses of the file systems they are built on. Local file systems have a single k- ernel that restricts access to file data. Because a distributed file system involves multiple servers and clients, it cannot rely on a single kernel to restrict access. The security problem is even greater since the network that connects servers and clients cannot be trusted.
The authenticated network attached disks we present address these problems by providing an architecture based on one-way hash functions providing for mutual authentication of the network disks and the clients. This architecture obviates the need for more performance intensive authentication methods such as public-key encryption and Kerberos [9] , but doesn't preclude the use of these architectures. The authentication protocol used by the network storage is very simple and flexible, and allows keys to be created and managed using existing authentication systems.
Before presenting our protocol, we review the components of distributed file systems in Ü2 as well as some advances in distributed file systems. Our authentication architecture is presented starting with Ü3. The authentication protocol is presented in Ü6. We conclude with a summary of this work in Ü8.
Distributed File Systems
In general, a distributed file system has four components: clients, file servers, authentication servers, and data stores. Client machines access files on behalf of users and applications. In this environment, users and their applications have credentials that are used to identify themselves to an authentication server or possibly directly to a file server. Swift [2] and Zebra [7] are examples of file systems that separate the file server and data store components. AFS [5] is an example of a file system that separates the authentication and file server components. In classical distributed file systems, all accesses to the data store are through the file server. The file server verifies the accessibility of the data before carrying out the request from a client. The data store is usually locally attached to the file server. Since the data storage is only attached to the file server, it can simply carry out the requests of the file server without having to authenticate or check access permissions.
File systems such as Swift and Zebra as well as the Network Attached Storage (NASD) [4] prototypes separate the file server and the data stores. The clients get the file system meta-data from the file server, but get file data directly from the data stores. One complication of separating data and meta-data is determining client access privileges. Both the file servers and the data stores must be able to verify that the client has access to the data.
In file systems that separate the authentication and file serving components, such as AFS, generally an authentication server is present and the client authenticates the user to the authentication server in the form of a password, ticket, or other authentication method. The authentication server gives the client new tickets that are presented to the file server. These tickets may grant access to specific files on the file server or may simply authenticate the identity of the user.
Serverless
The serverless file system [3] , developed in conjunction with the Network of Workstations (NOW) project at the University of California Berkeley, consists of a network of trusted workstations that cooperate to provide the functionality normally provided by a network server. The result is a file system that has no central repository of files. Instead, the file system data and meta-data is spread among the network of trusted workstations.
By spreading the file system data and meta-data across multiple machines, the aggregated resources are much greater that what would be found on a normal file server. These resources include cache size, network bandwidth, and processing power. Striping and logging is also used to boost performance.
Security for Network Attached Storage
When files are accessed by network clients, the requests must be authenticated and permissions checked before the access is allowed. The file servers generally do this kind of checking. However, if clients are allowed to directly access the disks, the disks must also be able to verify the authority of the client's access to the data.
In NASD, when a client wishes to access data on the disk, the client gets a capability from the file server to present to the network disk. The client then presents the capability with a request to the disk, at which point the disk verifies that the capability allows the requested action before actually carrying out the action. When using NASD a file server needs to exist to serve the meta-data and control access to file data stored on the NASD.
While the serverless file system yields dramatic performance improvements when compared to a more centralized file system, these performance improvements come at a price: reduced security. The client and manager kernel are trusted to protect the file system from malicious access. Thus, the serverless file system is designed to run in a trusted environment. This kind of environment can be found in NOW and in a network where all machines are administered and trusted equally.
The authentication protocols presented in the next sections extend the NASD abstraction by presenting authentication protocols that do not require encryption and synchronized clocks, while allowing for delegation of authority and shared keys that are necessary for building a serverless file system.
SCARED
The SeCure Authentication for Remotely Encrypted Devices (SCARED) protocols were developed at IBM research for use in network attached storage. One of the main design requirements was minimizing the management overhead of the storage devices. File servers require a substantial investment in management resources. By pulling the storage out of the servers and network attaching them, the number of managed network devices increases. If the administrative requirement increases proportionally to the number of devices, the system would quickly become unmanageable. The management of network attached storage is further complicated due to the lack of a management console with a keyboard and display. For these reasons we push the administrative overhead out to the clients, where the administration of the storage device can be done along with the normal configuration of the client to use the network storage.
Storage devices are deployed in environments with a wide variety of existing authentication systems such as Kerberos and public key based systems, so we did not want to assume too much about the environment in which the devices are deployed. The authentication operations done at the storage device are simple and allow the device to be oblivious to the security environment in which it exists. Since keys used to interact with the storage devices are generated and exchanged by users and administrators without having to communicate with the storage, the key exchanges can take place within the existing systems.
SCARED addresses authentication. We believe the confidentiality requirements of storage devices is best solved by encrypting and decrypting at the clients. Encrypting data is expensive in terms of processing overhead and introduces latency. By doing the encryption and decryption at the client the data is encrypted over the network and on the storage media itself, without any overhead at the server. S-CARED does not preclude link level encryption. Section 7 presents how encryption keys can be negotiated for use in link level encryption.
In the SCARED environment there are three roles: the client, the administrator, and the storage device. The storage device shares a key with the administrator. The administrator uses this key to generate other keys for use by the clients. Clients use the derived keys to access the storage devices.
An important feature of the SCARED protocol is that the administrator does not need to be online with the disk when generating secrets for the clients. Not only does this relax the network topology requirements, but it also also allows the administrator to give new secrets to the clients using off-line methods such as email.
A client uses the keys received from the administrator to generate Message Authentication Codes (MAC) [8] that are included in all message exchanges between the client and storage devices. A MAC function takes a string and a secret key and outputs a fixed length string. The MAC has some cryptographic properties that allow either party to verify that the message sender was in possession of a specific key and that the message was not changed in transit. Once the storage device checks the MAC, it grants access to the client based on the key used to generate the MAC.
In the next section we present a method of generating keys for clients without having to communicate with the storage device. Section 5 presents the different keys that are used to access a SCARED device. In section Ü6, the concepts presented in Ü4 and Ü5 are used to present the four types of messages that are exchanged between client and the storage device.
Key Distribution Without Key Exchange
In order to use MACs to authenticate messages between the clients and storage devices, they must share a key. S-CARED uses a key distribution scheme that does not require any key exchange or encryption.
We wanted to keep the device from having to do key management or be involved with distributing keys to clients, so the storage device itself knows only about one key: the disk key. This key is shared by the storage administrator and the storage device. It is the key upon which all other keys are based, and is used to bootstrap the security of the disk. We assume that the administrator receives the disk key with the storage device. This may be in the form of a smart card, disk, or paper that comes with the device. Another method, which is used by NASD, is to allow the administrator to generate and send the disk key to the disk when it is first connected to the network.
The disk key is used to generate the other keys needed by the clients to be able to generate and verify the MACs that are used when communicating with the storage device. The key derivation is based on a keyed one-way hash function, À´ Ãµ, that takes a public value and a secret key Ã as input, and outputs a new secret.
In order for keys to be meaningful to the storage device they need to have some data associated with them to convey identity and capability along with other data associated with the key. The hash function binds the data associated with a key to the key itself. In general, a key Ã ¼ is the result of À´ ¼ Ã µ, where ¼ is some public data associated with Ã ¼ and Ã is the key that is used to derive Ã ¼ . For example, the administrator can use the disk key to derive a key for a client and send it to him over a secure channel. When the client sends a message to the disk, he will include the public data associated with the key in the message, then MAC the message using the key obtained from the administrator. The device is able to regenerate the client's key using the public data and the disk key to verify the MAC.
The public key data allows the storage device to derive not only the key that the client is using, but also to check the access that the client has to the device. Because the key is derived using a one-way hash and the key data, when a key is used by a client, the client must also send the key data associated with the key. The binding between the key and key data allows the administrator to put information in the key data that the storage device uses to grant access to the client. By including a expiration date as part of the key data, the administrator is also able to limit the lifetime of the key.
Key Types
The authentication needs of a client and storage device differ, so the keys they use also differ. The client needs to verify the responses received from a storage device actually came from a given device. The device needs to verify that the client has the authority make a request. When a key is used by a client to send a request to the storage device, we refer to the key as an access key. A key used to verify the origin of a response, is referred to as a response key.
Another way of classifying keys is by the type of public data that is associated with them. If the data associated with a key has to do with the type of operations that can be done using the key and the targets of the operations, the key is referred to as a capability key. If the data has to do with the identity of the possessor or group membership, the key is referred to as an identity key.
Both capability and identity keys can be used as access keys. If the objects have access lists associated with them, the device will use identity keys to check access. If access lists are not used, the device must check access using capability keys. Access lists imply fewer keys to be managed at the clients, but more meta-data to be managed at the devices. Capability keys require very little meta-data to be managed at the devices, but more keys to be managed by the clients.
Since the clients are only interested in authenticating the device that generated a response, response keys are always identity keys. A client receives a response key generated specifically for that client by the administrator to authenticate responses from a specific device. 
The administrator shares a key, K, with the storage device which is used to generated keys to be given to the clients. In this example the messages must be exchanged over secure channels.
Generating Capability Keys
A capability key allows a specific operation to be performed on a storage device. The type of operation that is permitted and the details of that operation are governed by the data used to generate the key. The key that is given to the client is generated by hashing the disk key with the key data. The result of the hash is the capability key. The capability key and the data corresponding to the capability key are given to the client. Note that the capability key must be kept secret so a secure channel must be used to send the key to the client.
A capability key may be used to generate another capability key that is restricted subset of the capabilities of the first key. This can be done by anyone in possession of a capability key, not just the administrator, which makes it convenient for highly distributed file systems. When distributing the new capability key, the new key-data corresponding to the new key includes the data used to compute the new key and the key-data from the original capability key.
For example, in figure 1 if the the administrator wishes to grant Bob the ability to read and write object 232 on the storage device, the administrator would generate Ã ½ with the READ and WRITE attributes in Ø ½ along with object id 232. Bob could then grant Brenda the ability to read object id 232 by only including the READ attribute and object id 232 in Ø ¾ . Brenda could generate another capability key to read object 232, but could not generate a capability key to write to object identifier 232, since the WRITE attribute is not among the capabilities of the key that Brenda possesses.
Generating Identity Keys
Identity keys allow a receiver to check the identity of the sender by including an identification string as part of the key data. Just as was done with the capability keys identity keys are generated by hashing the identification string as part of the key data and the disk key. The resulting identity key and the corresponding key data are given via a secure channel to the client.
As with capability keys, identity keys can be used to generate other identity keys. When a new identity key is generated from another, the entity in possession of the original key is vouching for the identity of the entity for whom the key is generated. This allows a non-administrative user to create a new identity key to allow access to objects that the user can already access.
For example, in figure 1 if the the administrator wishes identify Bob to the storage device, the administrator would include a string identifying Bob in Ø ½ . Bob could then create a new key identifying Brenda to the disk by including a string identifying Brenda in Ø ¾ . It should be pointed out that the storage device would only recognize Ã ¾ as valid if Bob were authorized to identify other users or Brenda is only accessing objects that Bob can access.
SCARED Security Protocol
SCARED addresses three aspects of security: identity/capability, integrity, and freshness. When a message is received, the recipient needs to validate who the message was sent by or at least that the sender was authorized to send the message. Next, the receiver needs to validate the integrity of the message, or in other words, that the message was not changed in transit. It would seem that being able to validate the sender seems to imply that the recipient is also able to validate that the message was the message sent by that sender, but in practice this integrity guarantee is not always available. SCARED enables the network storage to validate both the identity of the sender and the message that was sent by the sender. Finally, the receiver must be able to validate that the message was sent recently (or that the message is fresh) or at least validate that the message is not a replay of an older message.
The first phase of the SCARED protocol is to establish a freshness guarantee. After a freshness guarantee has been established, the clients and storage use the message protocol to send responses and receive replies. When presenting the protocols it is assumed that the clients are in possession of the keys needed for accessing the storage, and that the storage is only in possession of the disk key. The access key used by the client is denoted by Ã and the key data corresponding to Ã is denoted by . The response key is denoted by Ã Ö and its key data Ö .
Freshness Guarantees
To guarantee the freshness of messages, SCARED uses timers, nonces, and counters. When using timers all parties involved in a transaction have timers that are reasonably synchronized. Nonces and counters do not require any kind of clocks, only that the nonce and counters never take on the same value. Counters are also required to be monotonically increasing. The clients always use nonces to check the freshness of response, since a nonce is a freshness guarantee with the fewest requirements. When illustrating the protocol exchange the client nonce will be denoted using .
Storage devices require clients to include a timer or counter in the request to check the freshness of the request. Since the client must be able to calculate the freshness guarantee that the device is using, nonces cannot be used. If the communication with the device is session oriented, the device can key a counter synchronized with the device based on the number of messages sent, otherwise, a time must be used.
The storage counter or timer will be denoted using × .
Before making requests to the storage, the client must request the storage counter or nonce using the following protocol:
When the storage receives the request in the first message, the storage is able to generate Ã Ö using Ö as shown in Ü4.
If MAC ÃÖ´Å µ as calculated by the storage device matches MAC ÃÖ´Å µ included in the request, the device knows that Å was generated by a client in possession of Ã Ö , so it will generate a response using Ã Ö . is copied unchanged by the storage device into the response. When the client receives the second message, it is able to check the MAC since it is in possession of Ã Ö , and thus know that it came from the storage. The presence of in the response allows the client to know that the message is in response to the first message. After the message exchange the client is in possession of × , the server freshness guarantee, which it uses to establish the freshness of future communications with the server.
Verifying Freshness using Counters
If the communication with the storage is session oriented, counters are convenient to use for checking the freshness of requests since they do not require clocks. At the beginning of the session the client will obtain × , the initial session counter. Each time the client transmits a packet, it includes the counter in the request and increments the counter for the next request. The device is able to verify the freshness of the request by ensuring that the the request includes a counter that is one greater than the previous request from the client. This implies that the storage device must be able to maintain a counter for each active session. The initial counter sent to the client must be generated in such a way that a counter used in a session with the device by the client was never used in a request by any client of the device in other sessions.
Verifying Freshness using Timers
If the communication with the storage device is not session oriented, timers are used to allow the device to check freshness without having to keep freshness information about all the clients. To use timers, all clients intending to communicate with a storage device need to synchronize their timers with the timer of the storage device. This is done in the first phase of communication with the disk by setting × to the current device timer.
The client synchronizes its timer with the storage device by saving the difference between its timer and the storage device's timer. Since the client maintains a delta between its timer and the device's, the storages devices with which it communicates need not, and in most cases will not, have synchronized timers. The client includes the device's current timer in all requests to the storage device. This enables the devices to check that the message is fresh in the sense that it was sent recently.
Because of network latencies, clock drift, and the latency of responses to requests, checking timestamps alone does not provide a strict guarantee of freshness. In particular an attacker could replay transactions in a small time window. To thwart the recent-past replay attack, a list of message authentication codes used in the recent-past are be kept and checked with each message. If the code exists in the list, the message is considered a replay.
To compensate for clock drift the storage device includes its current timer in all responses. The clients can then resynchronize their timers each time a response is received from the storage device.
The Request Protocol
The clients communicate with the storage devices using a request/response protocol. The client request has the form:
The operation requested and the data that goes with the operation are followed by the key data for the access and response keys that are used in this communication with the network storage. The device is able to regenerate the Ã and Ã Ö using and Ö , so that it can verify the MAC.
× is included to ensure that the message is fresh using either the counter or timer based techniques explained in the previous section. If the MAC is valid, the device knows that the message arrived intact and that it was sent by a client in possession of Ã , but it still must verify that the client is able to request the operation. The two approaches used by SCARED to check access are identity based and capability based. In identity based systems the disk needs to be able to check access based on the identity of the requester. In capability based systems the disk is only interested in the ability of a requester to perform a transaction.
Capabilities are granted by the administrator or a client in possession of a capability by generating an access key, Ã , with the capabilities contained in the key data, as explained in Ü5.1. Therefore, the client in possession of Ã is also in possession of the capabilities listed in . Since Ã may be derived from other access keys, the disk must ensure that each time the key is derived from another key, the capabilities in the key data of the derived key are a subset of the capabilities of the original key. To check if the client is able to carry out the requested operation, the device checks that the operation requested is listed as one of the capabilities.
If identities are used, will contain the identity of the requester. In order for the disk to check the ability of a requester to perform an operation, the disk must maintain access lists on each object. When a request arrives the identity in is checked against the access list of the requested object to see if the client can request the operation.
Response Protocol
The authentication needs of the client are quite a bit simpler than the needs of the disk, since it only needs to verify the response was sent by the disk in reply to the client's request. The device response has the form:
Ã Ö is used in the MAC since it is the secret shared by the client and disk. The capability and identity keys may be shared by different clients, but the response key, Ã Ö will only be held by one of the clients. After validating the MAC, the client will know that the response arrived intact from the disk. The presence of allows the client to check that the response is for the request that also included . × is included to compensate for clock drifts if timers are used by the disk. The key data are not included in the response since the requester must already be in possession of Ã Ö .
Revocation
Obviously the best way to deal with the problem of key revocation is to make the keys secure. Smart cards and tamper resistant chips are some of the ways of making the keys "secure". But the smart cards themselves can be lost, which would again necessitate the revocation of the keys in the cards. SCARED implements three ways of revoking keys. First, keys have a limited life time. Second, valid keys are controlled at the target. Third, all keys can be revoked for the storage device by changing the disk key.
Only access key revocation needs to be done at the storage device since response keys do not need to be revoked. Since response keys are used by the client to authenticate responses from the disk, the client simply stops using a key that has been revoked. The response key does not have any access rights associated with it, so an attacker would not be able to gain access to a storage device using a revoked response key. No client would recognize responses using the revoked key, so an attack against a client with a revoked key would also be useless.
Key Expiration
When an administrator gives a key to a client, the administrator can include an expiration time in the key data of the key. Given that a key can only be used at one target, the expiration time is relative to the timer on that target. By using relative time, the need for synchronized clocks is removed. The device can check whether an access key is expired by comparing the expiration time in the key data to its current timer.
Capability Key Revocation
To aid in capability key revocation, we associate salt to a capability key. Salt is a number, much like a nonce, that will never be changed to a value it has had previously. It is not considered secret and it is stored with every object or meta-data entry. When a capability key is generated for an object or entry, the salt of the object or entry must be included in the key data. When the key is used, the salt in the key data must match the salt in the object or entry being operated on.
Capability keys for an object or entry can be revoked by changing the salt at the object or entry. When the salt is changed, all of the keys that included the salt will be invalidated since the salt in the keys will be different from the new salt.
Identity key revocation
Identity key revocation can actually be done in two ways. The first uses revocation lists for unexpired and invalid identities. The second method is a simpler revocation scheme that requires the storage device to know a priori the identity of clients it will be communicating with.
When key expiration information is present in the key data, only keys that haven't expired need to be revoked. If it is assumed that most keys that are not expired are valid, then an efficient way of revoking keys is to give a list of key revocations to the storage device. Based on the previous assumption, the revocation list should be short so the identities present in requests to the disk could be checked against the list before accepting them as valid. Once a revoked key is expired, it would be removed from the revocation list to keep it from growing without bound.
The second way of doing identity based authentication is to include a counter in the identity key calculation. The counter is then stored in a table on the storage device indexed by the client id. When a client makes a request, the device verifies that the counter in the table is less than or equal to the counter included in the key data of the request. If the counter in the table is less than the counter in the key data, the counter in the table is set equal to the key data counter. To revoke a key, a new key needs to be generated with a new counter. When the new key is used, the table will be updated and the old keys will become invalid.
What to do About Encryption
A key feature of a secure distributed file system is the confidentiality of file data. Currently, of the commercial distributed file systems, only DFS [6] has the option of encrypting data exchange between client and server.
A stronger level of data privacy can be obtained if the data is encrypted by the client and sent to the server to be stored in its encrypted form. This kind of client side encryption is done by the Cryptographic File System [1] (CF-S) which encrypts data before being stored in a shadow file system and decrypts the data as it is read. Using CFS with SCARED would keep the data confidential and avoid the performance impact of encrypting at the storage devices.
CFS has a key distribution problem, since the encryption keys must be remembered and distributed by users. To overcome this problem we propose storing the encryption keys in the meta-data encrypted with group and user encryption keys. This allows keys to be obtained at the moment they are needed.
One of the problems with storing the encryption keys in the meta-data is that if group or user encryption keys are changed, all the meta data needs to be updated by reencrypting the keys using the new group or user keys.
If the storage devices are trusted to keep data confidential, the problems with encryption key distribution can be avoided by encrypting and decrypting at the storage devices. To encrypt the data between the clients and storage devices, they must share an encryption key. They already share a response key, so an encryption key can be generated by rehashing the response key with a public constant. But requiring the storage device to do link level encryption increases the processing requirements of the device.
Whether or not the network storage is involved in ensuring the confidentiality of the data, the SCARED protocol satisfies the authentication requirements of network storage.
Summary
The importance of distributed computing as the pivotal approach to managing computing resources and data is well recognized. Scaling distributed computing solutions has been a challenge. Network attached storage provides a solution for creating scalable network access to data, but requires reliable and efficient authentication techniques to ensure that while data is widely accessible, its content is secure from unauthorized access.
The architecture presented here provides a mechanism for efficient and reliable authentication to network accessible storage. The mechanism is simple and requires minimal infrastructure. Additionally, the authentication mechanism does not require encryption.
